After an unfair electoral cycle, Turkeyโs incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoฤan secured another term as the president of Turkey. How can we make sense of Erdoฤanโs victory considering deteriorating economic conditions, increasing authoritarianism, and the mismanagement of the humanitarian response after the devastating earthquakes? What does the future hold for Turkey ? Some of my comments appeared in the news section on City, University of Londonโsย websiteย to answer this question. Here are some detailed comments below.
The Opposition Faced Repression and a Smear Campaign
Since the failed coup attempt in 2016, repression against the political opposition has steadily increased in Turkey. Therefore, it is not a surprise to hear opposition leader Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaroฤlu labelling the contest as the โmost unfair election in recent yearsโ, arguing that all the means of the state were mobilised for the ruling party. Apart from establishing control over key institutions, Erdoฤan and his party systematically used fabricated videos and slanders to frame the opposition as an advocate of terrorism. Many members of the pro-Kurdish opposition party HDP, including the former co-leader Selahattin Demirtaล have been imprisoned since 2016. Another charismatic figure, Istanbulโs mayor Ekrem Imamoฤlu from the Republican Peopleโs Party was handed a jail sentence and a political ban months before the elections. By eliminating powerful opponents, the incumbent could shape the political terrain of the contest.
There Were Voting Irregularities and Media Bias
Apart from the repression, the election was marked by voting irregularities and media bias. According to the Reporters Without Borders index, Turkey is among the worst twenty countries in the World for press freedom. While critical journalists face multiple barriers, including attacks and arrests, the government has almost total control over state and mainstream private media. Also, many reports of illegal voting and observer intimidation occurred on election day. There were reports of opposition members being beaten and threatened during election monitoring. Yet, followers criticised the inability of opposition parties to address voting irregularities with an assertive voice.
The Ruling Block Obtained a Parliamentary Majority by Enlarging its Coalition
Forming electoral alliances was more beneficial for the incumbent, as it provided its parliamentary majority. Even though the AKPโs vote decreased from around 42 per cent to 35, the party was able to gain a majority by forming a solid alliance (referred to as the Peopleโs Alliance) with the Nationalist Movement Party and two Islamist parties, New Welfare Party and the Free Cause Party. The opposition coalition could not substantively increase its vote as the newly formed parties that joined the bloc by former senior figures of the AKP, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoฤlu performed below expectations. Furthermore, during the election process, parties of the opposition also seemed less united than the ruling block. This was most visible during the right-wing Good Party leader Meral Akลenerโs contestation of Kilicdarogluโs candidacy about two months before the election.
The Incumbent Deepened Polarisation and Used Foreign Policy to Claim Competence
The electoral race was marked by increased polarisation and counter-framing, which expanded beyond Turkeyโs borders. The dynamics of international politics have impacted the election results as it became a sphere where the AKP could claim competence and success. In a recent PSA Blog post, I reviewed that during their election campaign, the AKP, apart from their populist framing of the opposition as โforeign threatsโ, praised repeatedly that they could negotiate with both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war and make concrete progress such as the grain corridor initiative and prisoner exchange. While the AKP presented itself as a competent international actor, the political parties that make up the Nation Alliance and Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu focused more on domestic issues like Turkeyโs economic collapse, democratic backsliding, and justice. The AKP elites were able to frame themselves as peacemakers and have used it to enhance their legitimacy domestically and internationally.
The Road Ahead
The race was profoundly unfair and unbenignant. Turkeyโs pressing issue is addressing the coming economic problems as the lira plummeted to a record low yesterday. Apart from concerns about economic collapse, civil society groups and opposition parties argue that another term will worsen human rights abuses, the rule of law, LGBT+ and womenโs rights. In his โvictory speech,โ Erdogan labelled the opposition as โLGBT loversโ and contrasted his position by underlining the importance of โfamily values.โ It is visible that increasing polarisation will be the incumbentโs primary strategy against the political opposition.
In foreign policy, it can be argued that the AKP will maintain its strategic relationship with the West while preserving solid ties with Russia. However, Western leaders were quick to congratulate Erdogan, visible in the German Chancellorโs message stating that he wants them to advance a โcommon agenda with a fresh impetus!โ The opposition forces were upset with the EUโs response to Erdoganโs re-election and underlined that they need to do more to voice rights violations in Turkey.
It is important to note that AKPโs populism at home is shaped by its global contestatory frames contributing to a boundary between us and them. Especially the construction of the other has been vital in justifying the securitisation of the political opposition since the failed coup attempt in Turkey. With another term with Erdogan, Turkeyโs assertive and populist policy at home and internationally will further deepen.
It is official: Turkeyโs presidential election will go to a second round. The two candidates, Erdoฤan and Kฤฑlฤฑรงadaroฤlu, differ immensely in their domestic politics. What about their foreign policy outlook? Will the opposition candidate promise to break away from Turkeyโs assertive foreign policy? How do international dynamics shape this contentious electoral process?
Our co-convenor Begum Zorlu (City, University of London) has written on the role of foreign policy in Turkish elections for the PSA Blog.
When approached with the question: โwhatโs foreign policy got to do with the Turkish electionโ one feels the urge to respond: everything. After 20 years in power, and with international spotlight events like the challenging of the Israeli president Shimon Peres at Davos or comparing German officials to Nazis, Erdoฤan and his party dominates the conversation on foreign policy.
Contestatory moves like these are more important than they seem. These statements are the backbone of the incumbentโs populist foreign policy, where the party contests what it labels the โunjustโ and โbrokenโ international order, embodied in Erdoฤanโs famous slogan โthe world is bigger than fiveโ.
The expansion of an injustice frame and how it resonates in the world should not be underestimated.
Followers of Erdoฤan around the world voice this vision and have repeatedly underlined that he represents the interests of Muslims around the globe or supports โthe voices of the repressedโ. This contributes to promoting the incumbentโs framing that without Erdoฤan, Turkeyโs leadership in contesting injustices domestically and globally will be halted.
THE AKP AND THE INTERNATIONAL
Under Erdoฤan, Turkey has increasingly followed a confrontational foreign policy. However, this has not always been the case. Throughout its first term, along with its acceptance of EU conditionality as part of its desire for EU accession, the AKP used its foreign policy to advance its domestic power. In particular, the AKP came to present itself as a model democratic and Islamic state in the early 2000s. As Cihan Tuฤalโs work uncovered, the US was instrumental in promoting what has been termed the โTurkish modelโ, which resonated with the democracy promotion agenda of the US.
This context changed in the 2010s with the AKP aiming to have an increased influence in the Middle East in the context of Arab Uprisings and increasing authoritarianism at home. After the Gezi Protests of 2013, the AKP adopted a โfifth column[1] frameโ to delegitimise the opposition, accusing them of conspiring with international actors. With the 2016 coup attempt, increasing repression had domestic and international consequences. The AKPโs foreign policy took a more interventionist turn, as it directly interfered in multiple conflicts, and ultra-nationalist voices intensified in foreign policy. Turkeyโs military intervention in Syria hampered relations with its Western allies and justified the repression of critical voices at home. This is how we came to 2023, with increased domestic and international polarisation. The blocking of Swedenโs NATO membership for example clearly demonstrates the intersection of the domestic and the global. The AKP accused Sweden of harbouring terrorist organisations, highlighting the distinction between friends and foes on both political dimensions.
However, interventionism is not the sole component of the AKPโs foreign policy, and the party argues it follows a competent foreign policy. In their election campaign, the AKP praised that they could negotiate with both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, make concrete progress such as the grain corridor and prisoner exchange, and keep the possibility of peace on the table. They frame themselves as peacemakers and have used this mediation role to enhance their legitimacy domestically and internationally.
WHAT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION AND KILIรDAORฤLU ?
On the other hand, the political parties that make up the Nation Alliance and Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu have been weaker in voicing foreign policy and focused more on domestic issues like Turkeyโs economic collapse, democratic backsliding, and justice. When one looks at the electoral manifestos, while foreign policy makes up a small portion of the opposition coalition, it is one of the highlights of the incumbentโs document.
The opposition coalition and their presidential candidate promise a change in foreign policy. Contrasting themselves to the governmentโs policies, the opposition blockโs manifesto claims that they would change Turkeyโs foreign policy in the Middle East, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region and would not interfere in their internal affairs by โtaking sides.โ The presidential candidate Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu, on the other hand, bridges his domestic call for restoring democracy with his foreign policy outlook. The opposition coalitionโs manifesto underlines the dangers of personalisation in foreign policy, and Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu states that he wants to follow the democratisation processes promoted by the EU.
What about the stance on Russia ?A couple of days before the elections, Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu stated in an interview that if he won, he would bring Turkey closer to NATO and the EU and would be willing to impose sanctions on Russia. He has also accused Russia of releasing fake content on social media and criticised the government for maintaining energy dependency on Russia. This has become an area of contestation between the candidates; as a response, Erdoฤan stated that Russia is one of Turkeyโs most important allies.
Sevgili Rus Dostlarฤฑmฤฑz, Dรผn bu รผlkede ortaya saรงฤฑlan montajlar, kumpaslar, Deep Fake iรงerikler, kasetlerin arkasฤฑnda siz varsฤฑnฤฑz. Eฤer 15 Mayฤฑs sonrasฤฑ dostluฤumuzun devamฤฑnฤฑ istiyorsanฤฑz, elinizi Tรผrkโรผn devletinden รงekin. Biz hala iลbirlikten ve dostluktan yanayฤฑz.โ Kemal Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaroฤlu (@kilicdarogluk) May 11, 2023
While the opposition has a a pro-Western stance, there is also the framing of dignity from the block in their relations with the West. Their manifesto underlines that there should be a โrelationship based on equalityโ with the US. Similarly, in relations with the EU, the opposition block calls for joint responsibility and burden sharing between Turkey and the EU on refugees and notes its intention to review the Turkey-EU migration deal. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the coalitionโs election manifesto has combined migration policies with foreign policy.
From what can be interpreted at the moment, one of the reasons why the six-party opposition coalition is not bold on foreign policy is that this serves as a strategy to hold the group together. The block consists of different voices, from more nationalist to centre-right parties. While Erdoฤan dominates the AKPโs foreign policy outlook, the opposition is more fragmented. Also, even though the pro-Kurdish HDP party was not part of the coalition, the cities where Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤluโs votes were the highest were Kurdish-majority provinces. As the first round of voting demonstrated, without the Kurdsโ support, Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu cannot be elected.
The nationalist voices in foreign policy are likely to increase whoever gets elected, as the far-right candidate, Sinan Ogan, has received around five per cent of the votes and is critical in determining Turkeyโs new president. He recently spoke to Reuters in an interview stating that he would only endorse Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu in the runoff if โhe ruled out any concessions to the pro-Kurdish partyโ. Ogan defines himself as the representative of Turkish nationalists and is a staunch supporter of cross-border military operations. He also voices an anti-migrant agenda, arguing that โthey will send Syrian refugees by force if necessaryโ. Therefore the upcoming debates will reflect the anti-migrant and nationalist framing advocated by Ogan and the far-right.
CONCLUSION
International policy circles are debating the possible scenarios with the two prospective candidates, evaluating whether there will be a break with Turkeyโs assertive foreign policy if Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu gets elected. The answer is not straightforward, and the international dimension of the election deserves more attention. The AKPโs populism at home is shaped by its global contestatory frames contributing to a boundary between us and them. Especially the construction of the other has been vital in justifying securitisation, as the AKP elites link the political opposition, especially the Kurdish opposition, with foreign threats through a populist framing.
The elections were not free and fair, and as revelations of voting irregularities come in, there are contentious days ahead. If Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu gets elected, he promises to decrease the impact of foreign policy on domestic politics and strengthen diplomatic institutions. As stated, Kฤฑlฤฑรงdaorฤlu associates democratisation with enhanced partnership with Western actors, yet the opposition block does not promote a solid and uniform voice on their interpretation of the international order. While the coalition aims to restructure foreign policy and promote a more โrationalโ foreign policy, the AKP uses the sphere of foreign policy to bolden its injustice frame at home and around the globe. If Erdoฤan stays in power, Turkeyโs populist and assertive foreign policy will likely continue.
[1] A fifth column is defined as a group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nationโs solidarity by any means at their disposal.
We are holding an international conference open to academics, staff and students. Please find the information here and below.
Conference Description
In recent years there is a surge in scholarly debates on the origins, transformations, legacies, and applications of liberal internationalism. Although there is no consensus on the term and its analytical frame of reference, most historians trace the emergence of liberal internationalist ideology in anglophone debates on international order during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
More recently, the language of liberal internationalism has been redeployed by IR scholars as a remedy to the crisis of western liberal democracy. The time seems ripe to revisit the concept of liberal internationalism and rethink its multiple pasts and presents.
To what extent can one speak of a coherent โliberal internationalistโ zeitgeist? What does โliberal internationalismโ mean in different periods and in different contexts? Are there non-western liberal internationalist traditions? How has empire and nationalism shaped liberal and internationalist imaginaries? What sense to do we make of binary categories such as idealism/realism, internationalism/isolationism that have shaped the debate on liberal international institutions and politics?
The conference will bring together historians, IR scholars and political theorists to survey the field of liberal internationalism and sketch out future research directions.
Early Career Seminar
During the conference, there will be a lunchtimeย Early Career Seminarย (on 12th May, 12:30 – 14:00) addressed to PhD students and early career researchers across the humanities and social sciences. If you wish to present, please send a short description of your project and CV in one page toย Begum.Zorlu.2@city.ac.ukย by 28 April 2023. Download theย seminar flyer [PDF].
In the summer of 2022, British politics was dominated by two seemingly unrelated developments. On the one hand, the United Kingdom experienced record-breaking temperatures, with unprecedented heatwaves disrupting transport networks, public services and daily life, while intensifying debates over the government’s preparedness for the climate crisis. On the other, Westminster was consumed by the Conservative Party leadership contest that would determine the country’s next Prime Minister following Boris Johnson’s resignation. Although these events appeared disconnected, they both highlighted broader questions about political leadership, governance and the priorities of the Conservative government at a moment marked by economic uncertainty, rising inflation and an escalating cost-of-living crisis.
The leadership contest was precipitated by the collapse of Boris Johnson’s premiership following months of political instability. Johnson had survived a succession of controversies, including repeated allegations concerning breaches of COVID-19 lockdown regulations (“Partygate”), questions over ministerial ethics, accusations of cronyism and nepotism, and growing criticism of his leadership style. However, a wave of ministerial resignations in July 2022 ultimately rendered his position untenable, forcing him to announce his resignation after losing the confidence of a substantial proportion of his parliamentary party. Following several rounds of voting among Conservative Members of Parliament, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak emerged as the final two candidates, with the party membership entrusted with selecting Britain’s next Prime Minister. Importantly, both candidates had served in Johnson’s Cabinet and had remained loyal to his government throughout much of the political turbulence surrounding his premiership, raising questions about the extent to which the leadership election represented substantive political renewal rather than a change of personnel.
At first glance, the leadership contest appeared historically significant from the perspective of descriptive representation. The Conservative Party fielded one of the most diverse leadership races in British political history, with several women competing alongside candidates from ethnic minority backgrounds. The presence of politicians such as Kemi Badenoch and Suella Braverman was celebrated by many Conservative politicians and supporters as evidence of the party’s inclusiveness and its ability to promote women and ethnic minority politicians to the highest levels of government. Such developments were frequently contrasted with assumptions that progressive parties alone provide opportunities for historically underrepresented groups.
Yet the diversity of the candidate field also exposed the limits of equating descriptive representation with substantive representation. While the race featured an unprecedented number of women and minority candidates, none advanced a political programme centred on gender equality, anti-racism or the protection of marginalised communities. Instead, the contest unfolded within an ideological framework shaped by the Conservative Party’s broader positions on public spending, immigration, identity politics and culture-war issues. The candidates broadly endorsed a programme combining fiscal conservatism, support for restrictive immigration policies and scepticism towards contemporary social movements such as Black Lives Matter and trans rights. This reflected not only ideological continuity within the Conservative Party but also the broader political context of post-Brexit Britain, where debates surrounding national identity, sovereignty and cultural values had become increasingly central to electoral competition. At a time when the United Kingdom faced a severe cost-of-living crisis and widening social inequalities, critics argued that continued support for austerity-oriented economic policies would disproportionately affect women, low-income households and minority communities, despite the symbolic diversity represented within the leadership contest.
Among the candidates, Kemi Badenoch emerged as one of the most prominent representatives of the Conservative Party’s right wing. Born in London to Nigerian parents, Badenoch attracted considerable attention through her criticism of concepts such as white privilege and institutional racism, her opposition to expanding transgender rights and her broader critique of what she characterised as identity politics. She also generated controversy through statements questioning aspects of contemporary climate policy and comments that critics argued minimised or legitimised Britain’s colonial past. Although eliminated before the final stages of the contest, Badenoch’s campaign demonstrated the growing influence of culture-war politics within contemporary Conservative Party debates.
Similarly, Suella Braverman, whose parents emigrated from India during the 1960s, positioned herself firmly on the party’s right. A prominent supporter of the government’s policy of transferring asylum seekers to Rwanda for offshore processing, Braverman consistently adopted a restrictive approach to immigration and asylum policy. Following legal challenges to the Rwanda scheme, she argued that it was “time to complete Brexit and let the British people decide who can and cannot stay in our country,” framing migration control as an issue of national sovereignty and democratic self-government. Her campaign illustrated how immigration remained one of the defining ideological fault lines within the leadership contest.
Penny Mordaunt represented a somewhat different profile. Having spent almost two decades in Westminster, she became the first woman to serve as Secretary of State for Defence in 2019. Her political career also reflected longstanding engagement with transnational conservative networks, including participation in George W. Bush’s 2004 presidential campaign. Nevertheless, Mordaunt maintained broadly interventionist positions on defence and foreign policy, supported military engagement overseas and voted against proposals to establish a comprehensive inquiry into Britain’s role in the Iraq War. Although sometimes portrayed as representing the more moderate wing of the party, her record nevertheless reflected significant continuity with established Conservative positions on security and defence.
The final contest ultimately pitted Liz Truss against former Chancellor Rishi Sunak. Truss, who had begun her political career as a member of the Liberal Democrats before joining the Conservative Party, had held several senior Cabinet positions, including Secretary of State for Justice, Lord Chancellor and Foreign Secretary. Throughout the campaign she was frequently described as the candidate most closely associated with Boris Johnson’s political agenda and received the endorsement of several prominent Johnson allies, including Braverman. Her record in government had also generated controversy, particularly regarding foreign policy. Among the most widely discussed examples was her public support for British citizens volunteering to fight in Ukraine following Russia’s invasion, a statement that prompted criticism because participation in foreign conflicts raised complex legal and diplomatic questions. She also faced criticism over the government’s continued export of arms to Saudi Arabia despite ongoing concerns regarding the conflict in Yemen. Domestically, Truss repeatedly criticised what she described as “post-modernist” approaches to education and equality, arguing that schools devoted excessive attention to issues such as racism and sexism at the expense of literacy and numeracy. These interventions reflected a broader Conservative discourse positioning debates around equality and identity as distractions from educational standards and economic performance.
Throughout the leadership campaign, issues relating to gender identity and transgender rights occupied a remarkably prominent place in political debate. Rather than presenting competing visions for advancing gender equality or addressing structural inequalities affecting women, much of the discussion centred on restricting the rights of transgender people. International media observed this trend, with CNN describing the contest as becoming “a transphobic spectacle” because of the prominence of rhetoric directed towards transgender communities. At the same time, candidates’ broader parliamentary voting records revealed relatively limited support for measures concerning gender equality, climate action and refugee protection. Consequently, while the leadership contest represented an important milestone in terms of descriptive diversity, it did not signify a corresponding shift towards more inclusive or progressive policy agendas. Instead, it illustrated how the increasing diversity of political elites does not necessarily translate into substantive representation of women, minority groups or marginalised communities, demonstrating the distinction between symbolic representation and transformative political change.
Global SES podcast serisi, barฤฑล sรผreรงlerinin uluslararasฤฑ ve toplumsal dinamiklerine odaklanarak, kรผreselin etkisini ve iรง siyaset ile bir aradalฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ toplumsal cinsiyet perspektifinden ele alฤฑyor. Seriyi hazฤฑrlayฤฑp sunan akademisyen Begรผm Zorlu, โUluslararasฤฑ aktรถrler ve dinamikler tรผm barฤฑล sรผreรงlerinin ayrฤฑlmaz bir parรงasฤฑ. Bu sebeple bu seride, dฤฑล politika ve Kรผrt sorunu, iรง ve uluslararasฤฑ hukuk ve barฤฑล, iklim ve barฤฑล sรผreรงleri, kadฤฑn dayanฤฑลmasฤฑ, uluslararasฤฑ baฤlantฤฑlar ve barฤฑล konularฤฑna odaklanmayฤฑ seรงtikโ diyor.
Global SES #1: Kadฤฑn, barฤฑล ve gรผvenlik gรผndemi kฤฑskacฤฑnda Tรผrkiyeโde รงatฤฑลma รงรถzรผmรผ โ Prof. Dr. Ayลe Betรผl รelik
Begรผm Zorlu, Global SES baลlฤฑklฤฑ podcast serisinin ilk bรถlรผmรผnde Prof. Dr. Ayลe Betรผl รelikโi konuk ediyor. รelik, hem akademik hem de sivil toplum รงalฤฑลmalarฤฑndan yola รงฤฑkarak barฤฑลฤฑn toplumsallaลtฤฑrฤฑlmasฤฑ, kutuplaลmanฤฑn รงatฤฑลma รงรถzรผmรผ dinamiklerine etkisi ve kadฤฑn hareketinin barฤฑล sรผreรงlerindeki rolรผnรผ anlatฤฑyor.
Two years ago, we launched a campaign titled โWomen Call For Peaceโ to demand an end to the tension between Turkey and Greece in relation to the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. We are still making that call.
Begum Zorlu
Equality Justice Women Platform
There is again a worrying escalation of militarist language demonstrated with President Erdoฤanโs statement โwe can come suddenly in the middle of the night.โ
In his statement a couple of days ago the president stated that Greece would pay a โheavy priceโ if it does not halt military buildup on Greek islands near its coastline. The escalation of the threatening language drew attention regionally as the spokesman for European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, stated โthreats and aggressive rhetoric are unacceptable and need to stop.โ
In our weekly meeting for the Equality, Justice and Women Platform, we discussed how the language of escalation mirrored what has been termed the โmasculineโ style of politics, that disregards the language of reconciliation and conflict resolution. However, this language is unfortunately not new and it can be argued that it emerges when the incumbent wants to distract the public and create an environment to justify its โstyleโ of politics by amplifying a hostile other.
Two years ago, with a joint effort, we wrote a statement to demonstrate that the need for the promotion of a peaceful language along with diplomacy in relation with the Eastern Mediterranean crisis. Our statement rejected the concept of a hostile other and demonstrated the togetherness of women from the two counties.
Our statement underlined that โthe rhetoric of conflict and potential conflicts threaten not only the security of the citizens of both countries but also the entire region. We focused on the areas of cooperation between the two countries arguing that it was more important than ever at a time when the global pandemic is deepening inequality, leading to economic crises and increasing the marginalization of women. By amplifying the need for peaceful coexistence we called for Greece and Turkey to negotiate their differences through peaceful diligent diplomacy under the guidelines of international law and equity, if necessary, with observers from international institutions.
I took part in the formation, circulation and the exhibition of this call which was opened to signature on a website that we named โWomen Call For Peace.โ In an overwhelming and rewarding moment, we received hundreds of messages and signatures, from women living in both countries. The existence of an alternative call and the ties of solidarity created by that interaction has demonstrated to us that another reality and a rejection of the militarist language can be achieved.
So this week again the utilisation of a militarist language again has demonstrated how our endeavour to say โnoโ to this tone and to promote diplomacy, links between civil society agents is essential to change the conversation.
In her commentary, Begum Zorlu, PhD researcher at City, University of London, argues that by denying Kurdish politician Aysel Tuฤluk proper treatment for her dementia, authorities are putting her life at risk.
All persons under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Article 1; UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
Followers of Turkish politics are aware that since the coup attempt in 2016, democratic backsliding in the country has taken the form of unjust trials, rights violations, and political violence. The deterioration of rights has also been evident in cases of detention, which are clearly in violation of the basic principles for the treatment of prisoners highlighted in international treaties. Kurdish politician Aysel Tuฤlukโs continued captivity to this day demonstrates the cruelness of the current political climate in Turkey and marks a grave human rights violation.
Aysel Tuฤluk is a prominent Kurdish politician and a human rights lawyer who has been active in national politics for almost twenty years. She was the founding member and Co-Chair of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party.
Her life has been marked by struggle on multiple fronts as she explained in one of her interviews that the death of her father and brother during her childhood shaped her desire to enter politics. She was raised by a diligent mother, who tried to make ends meet to keep Tuฤluk in education. Tuฤluk described the losses she faced during her childhood as motivating her to enter politics.
Aysel Tuฤluk faced repression throughout her career and has been imprisoned since 2016 due to the charges on terrorism linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workersโ Party (PKK). However, as the solidarity group โ1000 Women for Freedom to Aysel Tuฤlukโ has outlined, these charges are linked to the speeches she made as a deputy, which are within the scope of freedom of thought and expression. While serving her sentence Tuฤlukโs mother Hatun Tuฤluk passed away in 2017, and the funeral was attacked by far-right protestors in Ankara. A large group attacked with stones and sticks and threatened to prevent the funeral. Due to this, Tuฤlukโs family decided to move Hatun Tuฤlukโs body from the cemetery where she was buried so that it would not be attacked. The crowd also shouted racist and discriminatory slogans like โwe will not bury terrorists here. This is not an Armenian cemetery. If you bury them, we will cut them to pieces!โ This undoubtably became a traumatising event as Aysel Tuฤlukโs farewell to her mother was marked by attacks and threats. Due to the continued threats and impunity, Tuฤlukโs motherโs body had to be transferred to Dersim. She was not able to attend the funeral as a permit was not given by the authorities. Tuฤlukโs family and friends believe that the attacks have triggered or contributed to her illness. She was diagnosed with dementia in prison last year.
The situation is getting worse and urgent action needs to be taken
Even though her illness is progressing, Tuฤluk is repeatedly facing obstacles to receiving the right treatment. After a long-term legal struggle, which recently concluded, the courts decided for her release. However, it was announced that Tuฤluk will have to continue to stay in prison, due to receiving a sentence as part of another case.
The situation is dire. As a result of the treatment and examinations carried out by Kocaeli University Forensic Medicine Department months ago, it was stated that Aysel Tuฤluk could not stay in prison. Her lawyer Ezgi Gรผngรถrdรผ, stated that Tuฤluk did not even remember the release decision given in the Kobanรช case . Despite multiple medical and expert reports stating that โTuฤluk cannot stay in prison aloneโ, the official Institution of Forensic Medicine says she can stay imprisoned. However, the same Institution of Forensic Medicine made a decision to release the General รevik Bir, who is also facing the same illness.
Solidarity Continues to Grow
Rights activists in Turkey and around the world have been working to raise awareness of her case and secure her release. In January, an application was made to the UN for the release of Tuฤluk and other sick prisoners. Bar associations and non-governmental organizations wrote a letter to the UN to take action on the state of sick prisoners. This letter, signed by bar associations, law and human rights organizations from countries around the world was sent to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Ill-Treatment, Independence of Judges and Lawyers, The Condition of Human Rights Defenders, Physical and Mental Health, and Minority Rights, and the Arbitrary Arrests Working Group.
Her captivity led to domestic and international reactions. The Republican Peoplesโ Party (CHP) Adana Provincial Organization Chair Mehmet รelebi has made a call for Aysel Tuฤlukโsย releaseย from prison. Feminist activists and authors like Silvia Federici and Angela Davis also sent calls of solidarity.
Free Aysel Tuฤluk Now
After the announcement that Tuฤluk will not be released, the โPlatform of 1000 Women for Aysel Tuฤlukโ gathered in front of the prison. Speaking at the gathering, Prof. Dr. รzgรผn said โUnfortunately, Aysel Tuฤluk no longer has the opportunity to meet her needs and maintain her personal care without assistance.
Tuฤlukโs continued captivity is making her illness worse, leading to an irreversible point with each passing day. As Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk put it earlier, โThe government is approaching this issue with hostility. It is inhumane to keep a person in such a state of health in prison.โ It is therefore correct to state that every day that Tuฤluk is being held amounts to the continuation of a human rights violation. She must be released immediately.
While there is comprehensive literature on the role of religion in society (Mardin, 2006) terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2008) regime characteristics (Menchik, 2016) and political parties (Layman and Layman, 2001); how it impacts “state identity” is a question that has received little attention. รztรผrk’s book fills the gap by focusing on the role of religion shaping state identity by focusing to the case of Turkey with a historical approach. The book’s central puzzle is to investigate religionโstate relationship as a crucial characteristic of “state ideology, identity and power” (รztรผrk, 2020, p.12). By looking at Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, known as Diyanet’s influence in four case studies, the book builds a portrayal of the dynamics of change in state identity. It looks at how do these changes manifest themselves in various areas such as foreign policy orientations and preferences of home and host countries.
While the book’s primary focus centers on the influence of religion under the AKP, it also sheds light on the significance of religion in shaping Turkish state identity. The initial chapters review the “institutional continuity” of the Diyanet, highlighting the contributions of different leaders in shaping this institution over time. Similarly, one of the strengths of this book lies in its examination of the processes of change, specifically how Turkey’s evolving foreign relations have influenced the perspectives of the host states. The author argues that the transition from a “secularist identity” to a religious one has profoundly impacted the dynamics of interaction. Furthermore, this emphasis on identity is intertwined with the importance of interests.
Drawing upon rich data accumulated over four years of fieldwork, the author demonstrates how religious soft power shapes Turkey’s foreign policy. The book shows the intricate relationship between religion and foreign policy by providing insightful anecdotes and reflections. For example, the author shares encounters with Bulgarian state officials who initially welcomed the input of the Diyanet. In the case of Albania, the book highlights Turkey’s role in exacerbating divisions among the country’s various Islamic factions.
The book offers a valuable contribution to understanding Turkish cultural diplomacy and its impact on state identity. It successfully bridges the gap in the existing literature by analysing the interplay between religion, foreign policy, and state identity.
The book addresses the growing interest in Turkey’s foreign policy and provides an on-the-ground focus on its identity and how it is manifested in the Balkans. The extensive fieldwork conducted in multiple countries adds originality, facilitates useful comparisons, and provides a compelling narrative about Turkey’s foreign policy identity. The insights gathered from interviews are valuable to researchers, especially given the challenges of data collection in a polarised political environment. Even though the author shares his reflections and how he is perceived by the actors in the field, there could have been more emphasis on reflexivity, and more reflections on power from the field dynamics. This would have provided the reader with a broader understanding of the fieldwork dynamics.
Bibliography
Bellin Eva (2008) Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politicsโ World Politics, Volume 60, Number 2
Juergensmeyer Mark (2008) Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qรฆda, University of California Press
Layman, G., & Layman, G. C. (2001) The great divide: religious and cultural conflict in American party politics.
Mardin, S. (2006) Religion, society, and modernity in Turkey. Syracuse University Press.
Menchik, J. (2016) Islam and democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without liberalism. Cambridge University Press.
Meksika’nฤฑn “Mega” Seรงimleri ve Kadฤฑn Mรผcadelesi
Meksikaโda geรงtiฤimiz gรผnlerde bir รงok yorumcunun โmegaโ olarak nitelendirdiฤi federal, bรถlgesel, ve yerel dรผzeyde seรงimler gerรงekleลti. Bir รงok medya kuruluลu, gerรงekleลen seรงimlerin, iktidardaki baลkan Andrรฉs Manuel Lรณpez Obrador iรงin bir test niteliฤinde olduฤunu vurguluyordu. Seรงimin ana aktรถrleri Obrador liderliฤinde Morenaโnฤฑn (Ulusal Yenilenme Hareketi) hakimiyetini sรผrdรผrdรผฤรผ Juntos Hacemos Historia[1]ve ona karลฤฑ รงฤฑkan, daha saฤ/klasik partilerden oluลan Va For Mexico[2] (Meksika iรงin ฤฐlerle) koalisyon bloฤuydu. รne รงฤฑkan ana konular arasฤฑnda, Obradorโun pandemi yรถnetimi, kutuplaลtฤฑrฤฑcฤฑ dili ve eyaletlerde artan, bรผyรผk ลehirlerdeki dรผลen popรผlaritesi vardฤฑ. Toplumsal cinsiyet perspektifinden seรงimleri takip edenler de kadฤฑn cinayetlerinin ve genel olarak ลiddetin hakimiyeti, yapฤฑsal reformlar ile gerรงekleลen toplum cinsiyet eลitliฤinin kadฤฑn temsiline etkisi รผzerine odaklandฤฑ.
Meksika siyasetinde รถnem kazanan koalisyonlar, seรงime giden sรผreรงte Obradorโun vadettiฤi kรถkten deฤiลimi gerรงekleลtirmesi iรงin en รถnemli araรงlarฤฑndan biri oldu. 2018 seรงimlerinde Morena tek baลฤฑna mutlak รงoฤunluk eลiฤine ulaลamadฤฑฤฤฑ iรงin, sonraki aylarda baลka partilerden koalisyon ortaklarฤฑnฤฑ kendi saflarฤฑna geรงirmeye baลladฤฑ. Yasama dรถneminde, PT (ฤฐลรงi Partisi) ve PES (Sosyal Karลฤฑlaลma Partisi) partilerinden geรงiล yaลandฤฑ. Morena, 2019โda PVEM (Meksika Yeลil Ekolojik Partisi) ile gerรงekleลtirilen ittifak sayesinde 334 koltuฤa ulaลarak Temsilciler Meclisiโnde โsรผper รงoฤunluฤunuโ saฤladฤฑ. Bu seรงimde Morenaโnฤฑn 2018 seรงimi ve ardฤฑndan yรผkseliลi dursa da, mรผttefikleriyle meclisteki รงoฤunluฤunu korudu. Fakat, bรผyรผk yasal ve anayasal reformlarฤฑ iรงin diฤer partilerinin desteฤine baฤฤฑmlฤฑ hale geldi[3]
Geรงtiฤimiz seรงimden bugรผne korunan baลka bir ลey ise kadฤฑn temsilinin รถne รงฤฑkmasฤฑydฤฑ. Meksikaโnฤฑn temsil eลitliฤindeki baลarฤฑsฤฑ, siyasi partilerin adaylฤฑklarฤฑnda cinsiyet eลitliฤini saฤlamalarฤฑnฤฑ zorunlu kฤฑlan 2014 Anayasa reformu sayesinde gerรงekleลmiลti. 2018 seรงimlerinde kadฤฑnlar Temsilciler Meclisiโndeki sandalyelerin yรผzde 48โini ve Senatoโdaki yรผzde 49โunu alarak bir ilke imza atmฤฑลtฤฑ. Birleลmiล Milletler Meksikaโnฤฑn cinsiyet eลitliฤini saฤlama yolundaki bu baลarฤฑsฤฑnฤฑ โeลi gรถrรผlmemiลโ olarak nitelendirmiล, Meksika bรถylece kadฤฑnlarฤฑn Parlamentodaki temsili aรงฤฑsฤฑndan ilk beล รผlke listesine girmiลti.
Obradorโun yรผkseliลini ve kadฤฑn hareketi ile iliลkisini irdelemek iรงin 2018 seรงiminin arka planฤฑna deฤinmekte fayda var. Yolsuzluฤa karลฤฑ kendini โdฤฑลarฤฑdanโ bir aday olarak konumlandฤฑran Obrador liderliฤindeki Morena (Ulusal Yenilenme Hareketi) 2018 seรงimlerinde benzeri gรถrรผlmemiล baลarฤฑ elde etti. Tarihsel olarak PRI (Kurumsal Devrimci Parti) ve PANโฤฑn (Ulusal Hareket Partisi) hรผkmettiฤi iktidarฤฑ siyasetin โkirliliฤineโ bulaลmamฤฑล bir aday olarak siyasi alanฤฑ sarsmฤฑล, ve bu mobilizasyonda da kadฤฑn temsilini รถne รงฤฑkarmฤฑลtฤฑ. Bรถylece, Morena, kadฤฑn gรผndemini 2018 seรงim kampanyasฤฑnฤฑn ana meselelerinden biri haline getirdi. 2018 seรงimlerindeki baลarฤฑsฤฑndan sonra, Obrador, ฤฐรงiลleri Bakanlฤฑฤฤฑ da dahil olmak รผzere kabinesinin yarฤฑsฤฑna kadฤฑnlarฤฑ atadฤฑ. Seรงimlerinin ardฤฑndan yine รงฤฑฤฤฑr aรงฤฑcฤฑ bir anayasa reformunu ile tรผm seรงilmiล adaylar ve yรผrรผtme ve yargฤฑ organlarฤฑndaki en รผst dรผzey gรถrevler iรงin cinsiyet eลitliฤi kuralฤฑ getirildi. โHer ลeyde eลitlikโ olarak adlandฤฑrฤฑlan reform, Mayฤฑs 2019โda kabul edildi. Tek bir Kongre รผyesi bile karลฤฑ oy kullanmadฤฑ.
Bรถyle bir kurumsal altyapฤฑ altฤฑnda gerรงekleลen seรงimlerde ise eyalet valiliฤi pozisyonunu[4] kazananlarฤฑn 15โte 6โsฤฑ kadฤฑn adaylar oldu. Kazanan 6 kadฤฑnฤฑn 5โi Morenaโnฤฑn adaylarฤฑydฤฑ. Bu tarihsel olarak kadฤฑn temsilinin dรผลรผk olduฤu bir kurum iรงin รงok รถnemli bir baลarฤฑ olarak รถne รงฤฑktฤฑ. (Bugรผne kadar sadece dokuz kadฤฑn seรงildiฤini not dรผลelim.) Gelecek gรผnlerde diฤer seรงim sonuรงlarฤฑnda da kadฤฑn temsili hakkฤฑnda da raporlar yayฤฑnlanacaktฤฑr.
Kadฤฑn Hareketi ve Obrador
Kadฤฑn temsilindeki baลarฤฑ Obradorโa ve partisine karลฤฑ feminist eleลtirileri sona erdirmedi. ฤฐktidara gelmesi ile birlikte Obradorโun kadฤฑn hareketi ile arasฤฑ aรงฤฑlmaya baลladฤฑ. Feminizmi bir โyabancฤฑโ ideoloji olarak nitelendirmesi ve kadฤฑn cinayetlerini kรผรงรผmsemesi bu ayrฤฑlฤฑลฤฑn en sarsฤฑcฤฑ รถrneklerindendi. Mart ayฤฑnda gerรงekleลen feminist protestolarฤฑnda on binlerce kiลi baลkentte yรผrรผyรผล gerรงekleลtirirken, hareketin kฤฑsmen โbu hรผkรผmetin baลarฤฑsฤฑz olduฤunu gรถrmek isteyenโ siyasi muhaliflerin iลi olduฤunu sรถylemiลti. Pandemi sรผrecinde aile iรงi ลiddet รงaฤrฤฑlarฤฑnฤฑn รงoฤunun sahte olduฤunu belirtmesi, Meksikaโnฤฑn aile yapฤฑsฤฑnฤฑ โistisnaiโ olarak tanฤฑmlayฤฑp akrabalฤฑk baฤlarฤฑnฤฑn Meksikalฤฑ kadฤฑnlarฤฑ istismardan koruduฤunu รถne sรผrmesi kadฤฑn cinayetlerine karลฤฑ skandal tepkilerinden bazฤฑlarฤฑydฤฑ.
Obradorโun seรงim sรผrecinde bir kaรง kadฤฑn tarafฤฑndan tecavรผz ile suรงlanan adayฤฑ desteklemesi ve adaya karลฤฑ suรงlamalarฤฑ politik olarak nitelendirmesi รถne รงฤฑkan sorunlardan biriydi. Birรงok kadฤฑn, Lopez Obradorโun Guerreroโnun ilk adayฤฑ Felix Salgadoโya verdiฤi desteฤe tepki gรถsterdi. Saldagoโnun suรงlandฤฑฤฤฑ vakalar arasฤฑnda iรงeceฤe uyuลturucu katฤฑp tecavรผz etme ve baygฤฑn olan kadฤฑnฤฑ fotoฤraflayฤฑp yayma tehditi de vardฤฑ. Salgado iddialarฤฑ reddetse de, sonunda seรงim yetkilileri tarafฤฑndan kampanya finansmanฤฑ usulsรผzlรผkleri nedeniyle yarฤฑลtan atฤฑldฤฑ. Yerine Guerreroโyu kazanacak olan kฤฑzฤฑ Evelyn atandฤฑ. Pozisyonu kazanan Evelynโnin kampanya sรผrecine babasฤฑ da aktif olarak katฤฑldฤฑ.
Seรงim ลiddeti ve Obradorโun Siyasi รslubu
Seรงimlerde yadsฤฑnamayacak en รถnemli dinamiklerden bir baลkasฤฑ ise kuลkusuz seรงim dรถnemi yaลanan ลiddet dalgasฤฑydฤฑ. Bir รงok kadฤฑn adayฤฑn da รถldรผrรผldรผฤรผ sรผreรงte, seรงim merkezleri ve kampanya sรผreรงlerinde korkunรง bir vahลet yaลandฤฑ.[5] 6 Nisanโda baลlayan kampanya dรถneminden seรงimlere kadar en az 34 aday รถldรผrรผldรผ, onlarca aday da hedef alฤฑndฤฑ ve saldฤฑrฤฑya uฤradฤฑ. (Sayฤฑsฤฑ 100โe ulaลan, farklฤฑ zaman dilimlerindeki ลiddeti inceleyen raporlar da mevcut.) Obradorโun kavgacฤฑ, hedef gรถsteren ve yok sayan iletiลim tarzฤฑ bu ลiddet sarmalฤฑnฤฑ ele almakta baลarฤฑlฤฑ olamadฤฑ[6]. Gรณmez Romeroโnun belirttiฤi gibi รถldรผrรผlen 89 politikacฤฑdan 25โi Morenaโnฤฑn koalisyonunun รผyesi olmasฤฑna raฤmen Obrador Meksikaโdaki seรงim ลiddetine iliลkin haberleri, kadฤฑn cinayetlerini ele alฤฑลฤฑ gibi โmedya sansasyonuโ olarak deฤerlendirdi. Tรผm bu ลiddet sarmalฤฑna raฤmen vurularak รถldรผrรผlen Belediye Baลkan adayฤฑ Alma Barraganโฤฑn yerine aday olan kฤฑzฤฑ Alma Denisse Sanchez Barraganโnฤฑn seรงilmesi gibi รถrnekler de kadฤฑnlarฤฑn mรผcadele etmedeki direncini gรถsterdi[7]
Kadฤฑnlar Tehdit Altฤฑnda
Meksikaโnฤฑn seรงim sonuรงlarฤฑnda her ลeye raฤmen kurumsal adฤฑmlarฤฑn kadฤฑn temsilinde รถnemli adฤฑmlar attฤฑrabileceฤi gรถrรผlรผyor. Obrador liderliฤinde Meksika รถnemli bir baลarฤฑya imza atsa da, ลiddetin รถnlenememesi, feminist hareketin kรผรงรผmsenmesi ve ekonomik sorunlar kadฤฑnlarฤฑn mรผcadelesinin sandฤฑฤฤฑn รงok รถtesinde olduฤunu gรถsteriyor. ฤฐktidar, kadฤฑn cinayetlerini durdurmakta baลarฤฑlฤฑ olamฤฑyor. รzellikle siyasette yer alan kadฤฑnlar ve gazeteciler ลiddetle her gรผn karลฤฑ karลฤฑya kalฤฑyor. Gazetecilerin tehdit mesajlarฤฑ โsana ve kฤฑzฤฑna tecavรผz edeceฤimโ gibi cinsiyetรงi, tehdit ifadeleri barฤฑndฤฑrฤฑyor. Kadฤฑnlar, รถlรผm tehlikesinin hakim olduฤu bir ortamda siyaset yapmaya รงalฤฑลฤฑyor. Bu seรงimler ise onlarฤฑn yฤฑlmadฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ, en aฤฤฑr baskฤฑ ortamฤฑnda bile mรผcadele iรงin alan aรงฤฑp, รผlkeyi saran umutsuzluฤu yenmeye รงalฤฑลtฤฑklarฤฑnฤฑ gรถsteriyor.
Notlar
[1] Partinin adฤฑ โBeraber Tarih Yazฤฑyoruzโ olarak รงevrilebilir. Ayrฤฑca koalisyonun her eyalet iรงin geรงerli olmadฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ not dรผลmekte fayda var.
[2] Koalisyon hakkฤฑnda mevcut bir Tรผrkรงe literatรผr olmasa da koalisyonun รผyelerinin (PAN, PRI, PRD) perspektiflerinden รถtรผrรผ โMeksika iรงin ฤฐlerleโ olarak รงevrilebilir.
[3] Meksika Yeลil Ekolojik Partisiโnin (Kฤฑsaltmasฤฑ: PVEM, adฤฑ Yeลil Parti olsa bile politikalarฤฑ รงok da Yeลil olmayan bir parti) oylarฤฑnฤฑn yรผkseliลinin Obradorโu stediฤi reformlarฤฑ gerรงekleลtirme aรงฤฑsฤฑndan limitleyeceฤi dรผลรผnรผlรผyor.(Bunda bir รถnceki seรงimde partinin Va For Mexico ile koalisyona girdiฤini ve idam cezasฤฑnฤฑ savunduฤunu hatฤฑrlatmakta fayda var.)
[5] France 24 kanalฤฑnda cinayetler รผzerine yorum yapan bir vatandaลฤฑn sรถzlerinden de bu anlaลฤฑlฤฑyordu: โsizi burada รถlรผmle tehdit etmiyorlar, direk รถldรผrรผyorlar.โ
[6] Buna baลka bir รถrnek vermek gerekirse Meksika Anayasasฤฑ ve seรงim yasalarฤฑ, kamu gรถrevlilerinin seรงimler sฤฑrasฤฑnda kendilerini veya siyasi mรผttefiklerini tanฤฑtmak iรงin hรผkรผmet mekanizmalarฤฑnฤฑ kullanmalarฤฑnฤฑ yasaklamasฤฑna raฤmen, Obrador seรงimlerde bu yรถntemi bolca kullandฤฑ. Meksika Ulusal Seรงim Enstitรผsรผ, cumhurbaลkanฤฑna basฤฑn toplantฤฑlarฤฑnda seรงimle ilgili konularda yorum yapmaktan kaรงฤฑnmasฤฑnฤฑ sรถyledikten sonra, Obrador kuruma karลฤฑ bir karalama kampanyasฤฑ baลlattฤฑ.
[7] ลiddet hakkฤฑnda bir รถnemli nokta ise bรถlgesel eลitsizlikler ve belli bรถlgelerde uyuลturucu ticareti sebebiyle yaลanan yรถnetim krizi. Siyasal ลiddettin รถzellikle bu bรถlgelerde gerรงekleลtiฤini not dรผลmek gerek.
Kadฤฑnlarฤฑn seรงilmesi ile toplumsal cinsiyet sorunlarฤฑnฤฑn รงรถzรผlmediฤinin de altฤฑnฤฑ รงizmekte fayda var. Bu yฤฑlฤฑn baลlarฤฑnda โviralโ olan bir videoda Hermosillo Belediye Baลkanฤฑ Cรฉlida Lรณpez, kรผrtajฤฑ destekleyen kadฤฑnlarฤฑ โmoronlarโ olarak adlandฤฑrdฤฑ ve birรงok kรผrtaj yanlฤฑsฤฑ aktivistin giydiฤi yeลil bandanalarla dalga geรงti.
[1] Partinin adฤฑ โBeraber Tarih Yazฤฑyoruzโ olarak รงevrilebilir. Ayrฤฑca koalisyonun her eyalet iรงin geรงerli olmadฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ not dรผลmekte fayda var.
[2] Koalisyon hakkฤฑnda mevcut bir Tรผrkรงe literatรผr olmasa da koalisyonun รผyelerinin (PAN, PRI, PRD) perspektiflerinden รถtรผrรผ โMeksika iรงin ฤฐlerleโ olarak รงevrilebilir.
[3] Meksika Yeลil Ekolojik Partisiโnin (Kฤฑsaltmasฤฑ: PVEM, adฤฑ Yeลil Parti olsa bile politikalarฤฑ รงok da Yeลil olmayan bir parti) oylarฤฑnฤฑn yรผkseliลinin Obradorโu stediฤi reformlarฤฑ gerรงekleลtirme aรงฤฑsฤฑndan limitleyeceฤi dรผลรผnรผlรผyor.(Bunda bir รถnceki seรงimde partinin Va For Mexico ile koalisyona girdiฤini ve idam cezasฤฑnฤฑ savunduฤunu hatฤฑrlatmakta da fayda var.)
[5] France 24 kanalฤฑnda cinayetler รผzerine yorum yapan bir vatandaลฤฑn sรถzlerinden de bu anlaลฤฑlฤฑyordu: โsizi burada รถlรผmle tehdit etmiyorlar, direk รถldรผrรผyorlar.โ
[6] Buna baลka bir รถrnek vermek gerekirse Meksika Anayasasฤฑ ve seรงim yasalarฤฑ, kamu gรถrevlilerinin seรงimler sฤฑrasฤฑnda kendilerini veya siyasi mรผttefiklerini tanฤฑtmak iรงin hรผkรผmet mekanizmalarฤฑnฤฑ kullanmalarฤฑnฤฑ yasaklamasฤฑna raฤmen, Obrador seรงimlerde bu yรถntemi bolca kullandฤฑ. Meksika Ulusal Seรงim Enstitรผsรผ, cumhurbaลkanฤฑna basฤฑn toplantฤฑlarฤฑnda seรงimle ilgili konularda yorum yapmaktan kaรงฤฑnmasฤฑnฤฑ sรถyledikten sonra, Obrador kuruma karลฤฑ bir karalama kampanyasฤฑ baลlattฤฑ.
[7] ลiddet hakkฤฑnda bir รถnemli nokta ise bรถlgesel eลitsizlikler ve belli bรถlgelerde uyuลturucu ticareti sebebiyle yaลanan yรถnetim krizi. Siyasal ลiddettin รถzellikle bu bรถlgelerde gerรงekleลtiฤini not dรผลmek gerek.
Bu yazฤฑ Koรง รniversitesi Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Kadฤฑn รalฤฑลmalarฤฑ Araลtฤฑrma ve Uygulama Merkeziโnin blog sayfasฤฑnda yayฤฑnlanmฤฑลtฤฑr. Eลitlik, Adalet, Kadฤฑn Platformu iรงin Tรผrkรงe’ye รงevrilmiลtir. Yazฤฑnฤฑn ฤฐngilizce orijinaline bu linkten eriลebilirsiniz.
Giriล
2020 koronavirรผs salgฤฑnฤฑ hayatฤฑmฤฑza bir ลok etkisi yaratarak girse de neoliberal hegemonya kapsamฤฑnda devletlerin yaptฤฑฤฤฑ siyasi seรงimler gรถz รถnรผne alฤฑndฤฑฤฤฑnda, o kadar da beklenmedik deฤildi. 1970โlerden beri uygulanan mali kฤฑsฤฑtlamalar ve รถzelleลtirme politikalarฤฑ devletin denetleme kapasitesini sistematik olarak zayฤฑflatarak sosyal refahฤฑ, insan gรผvenliฤini ve gezegeni tehlikeye sokmuลtur.
Pandemi, devletler topluluฤunun birbiriyle ne kadar baฤฤฑntฤฑlฤฑ olduฤunu ve ortak sorunlara kolektif bir yanฤฑt vermenin aciliyetini ortaya รงฤฑkardฤฑ. ฤฐronik olarak, aynฤฑ zamanda kendi kendine yeterlilik savunucularฤฑnฤฑ da cesaretlendirdi. Bu nedenle, kรผresel iล birliฤi iรงin Covid-19 mirasฤฑnฤฑn karmaลฤฑk ve รงok yรถnlรผ olmasฤฑ muhtemeldir.
Pandeminin olasฤฑ etkilerini anlamamฤฑz aรงฤฑsฤฑndan mevcut krizin toplumsal cinsiyet รผzerindeki etkisi gรผรงlรผ bir giriล noktasฤฑ sunuyor. Pandeminin kadฤฑnlar รผzerindeki olumsuz sonuรงlarฤฑ hakkฤฑnda รงok ลey yazฤฑldฤฑ ve bunlar bรผyรผk รถlรงรผde etkinin orantฤฑsฤฑzlฤฑฤฤฑna odaklandฤฑ. Bu popรผler sรถylemden uzaklaลmak ve mevcut krizin toplumsal cinsiyete dayalฤฑ sonuรงlarฤฑnฤฑn sadece kadฤฑn ve erkek arasฤฑndaki gรถreli bir farklฤฑlฤฑk meselesi olmadฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ, sorunun daha รงok sistemsel ve yapฤฑsal bir nitelik taลฤฑdฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ savunmak istiyorum. Toplumsal cinsiyet iliลkileri kadฤฑnlarฤฑ bakฤฑm erkekleri de geรงimden sorumlu kiลiler olarak konumlandฤฑran ataerkil iล bรถlรผmรผnรผn sonucudur. Tarihsel olarak ana akฤฑm ekonomi ve yรถnetim biรงimlerinin รถrgรผtlenme mantฤฑฤฤฑ ailenin geรงimini saฤlayan erkek (hane halkฤฑ reisi) normu รผzerine kurulurken, bakฤฑm bu mantฤฑฤa ikincil kฤฑlฤฑnmฤฑลtฤฑr.
Pandemi bu ana akฤฑm sistemi bozarken, iล dรผnyasฤฑ ve kamusal alan ลimdi kargaลa iรงinde ve toplumsal cinsiyet eลitliฤi ve uluslararasฤฑ iliลkiler iรงin derin etkileri olan birbiriyle iliลkili iki eฤilimi kรถrรผklรผyor: (i) bakฤฑm krizi ve (ii) gรผvenlikleลtirme.
Bakฤฑm krizi
ฤฐktisatรงฤฑlara gรถre, mevcut durgunluk olaฤandฤฑลฤฑdฤฑr ve istihdam etkileri bakฤฑmฤฑndan, รถnceki ekonomik gerilemelere kฤฑyasla belirgin bir ลekilde farklฤฑdฤฑr. รnceki krizler ya aฤฤฑrlฤฑkla erkekleri ya da kadฤฑn ve erkekleri aลaฤฤฑ yukarฤฑ eลit olarak etkilemiลti[1]. ฤฐmalat ve inลaat gibi erkeklerin egemen olduฤu sektรถrler ekonomik dรถngรผlerle yakฤฑndan baฤlantฤฑlฤฑyken, kadฤฑnlarฤฑn egemen olduฤu, hizmetle ilgili sektรถrler normalde daha az dรถngรผseldir. Mevcut kriz en รงok bu daha az dรถngรผsel iลleri vurarak kadฤฑn istihdamฤฑnda keskin bir dรผลรผลe neden oldu, ancak kadฤฑnlar aynฤฑ zamanda virรผsle mรผcadelenin รถn saflarฤฑnda yer alan temel iลlerde aฤฤฑrlฤฑklฤฑ olarak temsil edilmeye devam etti (รถrneฤin saฤlฤฑk รงalฤฑลanlarฤฑnฤฑn %70โinden fazlasฤฑ kadฤฑn).
Salgฤฑnฤฑn baลlangฤฑcฤฑndan bu yana, piyasa ekonomisi yavaลlarken hem รผcretli hem de รผcretsiz bakฤฑm emeฤine olan talep arttฤฑ. Pandemi ile baลa รงฤฑkmak iรงin devlet ne kadar az saฤlayabilmiลse, haneler ve topluluklar o kadar daha fazla yรผkรผn altฤฑna girme zorunda kalmฤฑลlar ve bir bakฤฑm krizi patlamasฤฑ yaลanmฤฑลtฤฑr.
Bakฤฑm ekonomisi uzun sรผredir krizde olsa da gรผnlรผk yaลamฤฑ kรผresel รถlรงekte etkisi altฤฑna almasฤฑ mevcut pandeminin bir sonucudur. Yeniden รผretim iลiyle baฤlantฤฑlฤฑ toplam bakฤฑm emeฤi, ekonomik faaliyetin bรผyรผk bir dilimini oluลturur. รcretli bakฤฑm emeฤi, kรผresel iลgรผcรผnรผn %11,5โini teลkil ediyor ve รงalฤฑลanlarฤฑn รผรงte ikisi kadฤฑn (Uluslararasฤฑ รalฤฑลma รrgรผtรผ). รcretsiz bakฤฑm iลi gรผnde yaklaลฤฑk 16,4 milyar saat, yani 2 milyar iลe denk geliyor ve yine bunlarฤฑn dรถrtte รผรงรผnden fazlasฤฑ kadฤฑnlar ve kฤฑzlar tarafฤฑndan yapฤฑlฤฑyor.
Bununla birlikte, bakฤฑm iลi bรผyรผk รถlรงรผde kรผรงรผmseniyor; รผcretsiz bileลeni gรถrรผnmez kalฤฑyor ve GSYฤฐH gibi geleneksel ekonomik faaliyet รถlรงรผlerin dฤฑลฤฑnda tutuluyor. Kadฤฑnsฤฑ olarak kliลeleลtirilen รผcretli bakฤฑm iลi ise, iลverenlerin dรผลรผk รผcretli, esnek, kolay harcanabilir ve deฤiลtirilebilir iลรงi teminini kolaylaลtฤฑrฤฑyor. Feministler uzun zamandฤฑr bakฤฑm iลlerinin deฤersizleลtirilmesini kadฤฑnlarฤฑn boyun eฤdirilmesinin ve sรถmรผrรผlmesinin kaynaฤฤฑ olarak tanฤฑmladฤฑlar. 1972โde ฤฐtalyaโda baลlayan โEv ฤฐลine รcretโ (Wages for Housework) kampanyalarฤฑnฤฑ, bakฤฑm emeฤine gรถrรผnรผrlรผk kazandฤฑrmak iรงin paha biรงilmez pek รงok giriลim izledi. Ancak bunlar bรถlรผnmรผล politika ve uygulamalarฤฑn รถtesine geรงemedi ve bakฤฑm iลleri bรผyรผk รถlรงรผde รถzel yaลamฤฑn gรถlgesinde fark edilmez kaldฤฑ.
ฤฐtalyan feminist Sylvia Federici, 30 yฤฑlฤฑ aลkฤฑn bir sรผre รถnce bakฤฑm iลinin deฤersizleลtirilmesinin tehlikeleri konusunda uyarmฤฑลtฤฑ ve sonunda gรถrmezden gelinemeyecek kadar bรผyรผk bir krize dรถnรผลeceฤini belirtmiลti. Ana akฤฑm kamusal yaลamฤฑ kesintiye uฤratan pandemi, gerรงekten de bu gerรงeฤi gรถrmezden gelinemeyecek kadar bรผyรผk bir hale getirdi: bakฤฑm ekonomisindeki kriz tรผm kesimlerin dikkatini รงekecek hale geldi.
Ana akฤฑm geรงim modeli
Geรงimden sorumlu erkek modeline dayanan ana akฤฑm ekonomi, yฤฑllar iรงinde รถnemli deฤiลim geรงirdi. Kรผresel รงapta yaลanan sosyo-ekonomik dรถnรผลรผmler ve kadฤฑn haklarฤฑ hareketleri sonucunda kadฤฑnlar artan sayฤฑlarla iลgรผcรผ piyasasฤฑna entegre oldu.
ฤฐstihdam ve karar alma pozisyonlarฤฑnda cinsiyet dengesi ile รถlรงรผlen toplumsal cinsiyet eลitliฤi gรถstergeleri, devletler ve uluslararasฤฑ kuruluลlar iรงin politika hedefleri haline geldi. Orta sฤฑnฤฑf ve varlฤฑklฤฑ kadฤฑnlar iรงin bu, bakฤฑm ve ev sorumluluklarฤฑnฤฑ daha az avantajlฤฑ kadฤฑnlara devretmek anlamฤฑna geliyordu. Alt sฤฑnฤฑftan kadฤฑnlar zaten uzun sรผredir fabrika ve sฤฑradan iลlerde ucuz emek kaynaฤฤฑ olmuลtu.
Pandemi dรถneminde kapanma kararlarฤฑ eฤitim ve ticaret sektรถrlerinin yerinde faaliyetlerini kesintiye uฤrattฤฑ ve bu faaliyetlerin bรผyรผk kฤฑsmฤฑ modern aileye devredildi. Bรถylece, aile ortamฤฑ uzlaลmaz taleplerin, artan รผretim, sรถmรผrรผ ve istismarฤฑn yaลandฤฑฤฤฑ bir รงatฤฑลma alanฤฑna dรถnรผลtรผ. Geleneksel kamu/รถzel, ev iรงi/profesyonel, รผcretli/รผcretsiz emek ikililerinin sฤฑnฤฑrlarฤฑ bulanฤฑklaลtฤฑ. Covid-19 kapsamฤฑnda, iลlerin uzaktan yapฤฑlฤฑp yapฤฑlmayacaฤฤฑna ve zorunlu evde kalma politikalarฤฑna gรถre belirlenen yeni ayrฤฑm, kapanmadฤฑr.
Kapanma รถzellikle aลฤฑrฤฑ kalabalฤฑk haneler ve aรงฤฑk alana, teknolojiye ve gรผvenli gelire eriลimi olmayanlar iรงin รงok sayฤฑda zorluk ve kฤฑrฤฑlganlฤฑk yarattฤฑ. Devlet destek paketlerinin yetersiz olduฤu รผlkelerde, dezavantajlฤฑ gruplarฤฑn hayatta kalmasฤฑ ciddi bir mรผcadele haline geldi. Salgฤฑna yรถnelik politika tepkileri, mevcut eลitsizlikleri derinleลtirirken yenilerini tetikledi ve intiharlar, yaygฤฑnlaลan ลiddet vb. gibi sosyal patolojilerde patlamalar yarattฤฑ.
Orta sฤฑnฤฑf profesyonel kadฤฑnlar, ana akฤฑm kamusal yaลama entegre olma ve cam tavanฤฑ kฤฑrma mรผcadelesinde yฤฑllarca gรถreli baลarฤฑ elde ettikten sonra, kendilerini bakฤฑm ve ev iลinin birincil saฤlayฤฑcฤฑlarฤฑ olarak bir kez daha eve kapanmฤฑล buldular โ ki bu durum, kendilerinin bunun รถtesine geรงtiฤini dรผลรผnenleri bile etkiledi. Bu kaba uyanฤฑลฤฑ birรงok soruyu da beraberinde getirdi: geรงtiฤimiz on yฤฑllarda kadฤฑn haklarฤฑnda kaydedilen ilerlemeler sadece bir yanฤฑlsama mฤฑydฤฑ? / ana akฤฑm ataerkil iล bรถlรผmรผ รถzรผnรผ koruyarak kendini yeniden mi รผretti? / biz kadฤฑnlar baลladฤฑฤฤฑmฤฑz yere geri mi dรถndรผk?
Gรผvenlikleลtirme
Baลka bir dรผzeyde, tarih boyunca yaลanan diฤer ekonomik krizler gibi, mevcut pandemi, ikiz kulelere yรถnelik 11 Eylรผl 2001 saldฤฑrฤฑlarฤฑndan bu yana zaten yรผkselen bir eฤilim olan milliyetรงi emelleri ve gรผvenlikleลtirmeyi pekiลtirdi. Covid-19, milliyetรงi sรถylemlere meyilli sosyo-ekonomik รงฤฑkarlara sฤฑnฤฑrlarฤฑ kapatmak ve kritik tฤฑbbi malzemeler ve temel gฤฑda รผrรผnleri รผzerinde ihracat kฤฑsฤฑtlamalarฤฑ uygulamak iรงin elveriลli bir zemin saฤladฤฑ.
Otoriter hรผkรผmetler, muhafazakรขr gรผndemlerini ilerletme fฤฑrsatฤฑnฤฑ yakalamakta hฤฑzlฤฑ davrandฤฑlar ve pandemiyi hak ve รถzgรผrlรผklere baskฤฑ yapmak iรงin araรงsallaลtฤฑrdฤฑlar; kadฤฑn haklarฤฑ genelde hedeflerin รถn saflarฤฑnda yer aldฤฑ. Bu baฤlamda, birรงok hรผkรผmet katฤฑ kรผrtaj yasalarฤฑ yรผrรผrlรผฤe soktu, protestolarฤฑ yasakladฤฑ, aile odaklฤฑ ideolojileri destekledi ve evrensel insan haklarฤฑ standartlarฤฑnฤฑ yerel kรผltรผre ve dine yabancฤฑ olarak karaladฤฑ. ฤฐstanbul Sรถzleลmesi etrafฤฑndaki tartฤฑลmalar ve Tรผrkiyeโnin nihai olarak anlaลmadan รงekilmesi bu aรงฤฑdan aรงฤฑklayฤฑcฤฑdฤฑr. Polonyaโnฤฑn benzer bir yol izlemesi olasฤฑdฤฑr.
Uluslararasฤฑ hukuk ve hรผkรผmetler arasฤฑ kurumlara yรถnelik artan ลรผphecilik, รงok taraflฤฑlฤฑฤฤฑ (multilateralism) bir krize sรผrรผkledi. Yeni otoriterlik, mevcut pandemiye iliลkin sorunlarฤฑ, uluslararasฤฑ baฤฤฑmlฤฑlฤฑk ve dฤฑลardan empoze edilen normlara baฤlฤฑyor ve bu durumu gรผvenlikleลtirme, milliyetรงi รงรถzรผmler ve sert sฤฑnฤฑrlar uygulayarak dรผzeltmeyi hedefliyor. ฤฐlginรงtir ki, bu otoriter hรผkรผmetler koronavirรผs pandemisinden kaynaklanan saฤlฤฑk ve sosyo-ekonomik ihtiyaรงlara etkin bir ลekilde yanฤฑt vermede รงok az baลarฤฑ gรถsterebilmiลlerdir.
Covid-19โun hayatฤฑ tehdit eden riskleri, kapanma uygulamalarฤฑ, ev iรงi sorumluluklarฤฑn artmasฤฑ, baskฤฑcฤฑ devlet politikalarฤฑyla birleลince kadฤฑnlar tekrar รถzel alana hapsedildi ve kadฤฑn รถrgรผtlerinin toplumsal cinsiyete dayalฤฑ ลiddet ve insan haklarฤฑ ihlallerine karลฤฑ aktivizmleri kฤฑsฤฑtlandฤฑ. ฤฐyi haber ลu ki, dayanฤฑลma aฤlarฤฑnฤฑ yerelden kรผresele, birรงok dรผzeyde geniลletmek iรงin interneti etkili bir ลekilde kullanan kadฤฑn รถrgรผtleri direnรงli olduklarฤฑnฤฑ kanฤฑtladฤฑlar.
Bakฤฑm krizi ve gรผvenlikleลtirmenin kesiลme noktalarฤฑ
Covid-19 salgฤฑnฤฑ, ana akฤฑm kamu/รถzel ikiliฤinin kฤฑrฤฑlganlฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ gรถzler รถnรผne serdi ve bakฤฑm emeฤinin ailelerin, toplumlarฤฑn ve ekonomilerin idamesinde temel bir bileลen olduฤunu ortaya รงฤฑkardฤฑ. Tarihsel olarak, kadฤฑnฤฑn รผcretsiz emeฤi sayesinde, geรงiminsaฤlayฤฑcฤฑsฤฑ son kertede haneler olmuลtur.
Kadฤฑnฤฑn รผcretsiz ve รผcretli bakฤฑm emeฤinin piyasa, devlet ve ataerkil cinsiyet rejimi idamesindeki รถnemi onlarฤฑn neden rฤฑza ya da zorla yerlerinde tutulmalarฤฑ gerektiฤini de aรงฤฑklayan bir faktรถrdรผr. Ancak, yฤฑllarca sรผren kadฤฑn haklarฤฑ mรผcadeleleri ve dรผnya รงapฤฑndaki daha yakฤฑn tarihlerdeki feminist grev dalgalarฤฑnฤฑn kanฤฑtladฤฑฤฤฑ gibi, kadฤฑnlar artฤฑk kapitalizmin dalga kฤฑranฤฑ olmaya ve รถnceden belirlenmiล bakฤฑcฤฑ rolรผne boyun eฤmeye istekli deฤiller.
Ayrฤฑca, dรผลme eฤiliminde olan doฤurganlฤฑk seviyeleri ve hane halkฤฑnฤฑn deฤiลen demografik yapฤฑsฤฑ kronik bir bakฤฑm iลgรผcรผ aรงฤฑฤฤฑna iลaret ediyor. Yรผksek doฤum oranlarฤฑnฤฑn teลviki, esnek รงalฤฑลma dรผzenlemeleri, bakฤฑm sorumluluklarฤฑnฤฑn รงiftler tarafฤฑndan paylaลฤฑlmasฤฑ veya akฤฑllฤฑ robotlarฤฑn icadฤฑ gibi konulardaki politikalar, uygulanabilir ve sรผrdรผrรผlebilir bir รงรถzรผm vaat etmekte yetersiz kalฤฑyor.
Popรผlist geri tepki (backlash) ve muhafazakรขr cinsiyet politikalarฤฑ, istikrarsฤฑzlaลtฤฑrฤฑlmฤฑล geleneksel ataerkil dรผzeni yeniden tesis etmeye yรถnelik umutsuz รงabalardฤฑr; bu dรผzenin sรผrdรผrรผlmesi artฤฑk daha fazla baskฤฑ ve ลiddet gerektiriyor.
Bugรผn en belirgin meydan okumaya maruz kalan ataerki ve kapitalizm, โmedeniโ dรผnyayฤฑ bir yol ayrฤฑmฤฑyla karลฤฑ karลฤฑya bฤฑrakmaktadฤฑr. Ana akฤฑm demokratikleลtirilmedikรงe ve bakฤฑm krizi kesin olarak รงรถzรผlmedikรงe, hak/hukuku, uluslararasฤฑ iล birliฤini ve รงok taraflฤฑ diplomasiyi zora sokan otoriter popรผlist ลahlanฤฑล kaรงฤฑnฤฑlmaz gรถrรผnรผyor.
Son sรถzler
Bakฤฑm artฤฑk รถzel bir mesele ve รถzselleลtirilmiล kadฤฑn cinsine mahsus bir sorumluluk olarak algฤฑlanamaz. Devlet, ekonomi ve uluslararasฤฑ sistemin รถrgรผtsel ilkesi olarak ana akฤฑm geรงim modelinden bakฤฑma dayalฤฑ bir modele geรงmek iรงin acil bir paradigma deฤiลimine ihtiyaรง var. Bunun iรงin, bakฤฑmฤฑ bir meta olarak deฤil, insanlara ve gezegene yรถnelik รถzensizliฤi etkili bir ลekilde ortadan kaldฤฑrabilecek etik bir deฤer olarak ele almak gerekir.
Salgฤฑnฤฑn ardฤฑndan gรผรง ve รงฤฑkar iliลkilerinin nasฤฑl ve hangi yรถnde geliลeceฤini gรถreceฤiz. Bazฤฑ gรถzlemciler neoliberalizmin sonunu ilan etseler de kรผรงรผk tavizlerle varlฤฑฤฤฑnฤฑ sรผrdรผrebilir ve yeni normalde her ลey รถnceki haline geri dรถnerek bakฤฑm yine kenara atฤฑlabilir. Diฤer taraftan, gรผvenlikleลtirme yaklaลฤฑmฤฑ, her ne kadar Covid-19โun etkili bir biรงimde yรถnetiminde yetersiz olduฤu kanฤฑtlanmฤฑล olsa da, kรผresel siyasete hรผkmetmeye devam edebilir ve dรผnyayฤฑ Soฤuk Savaล dรถnemini anฤฑmsatan koลullara doฤru sรผrรผkleyebilir.
Ancak, pandemi ile ortaya รงฤฑkan รงoklu krizler gรถz รถnรผne alฤฑndฤฑฤฤฑnda, daha olumlu bir seรงenek, insanlarฤฑn ve doฤanฤฑn sรถmรผrรผlmesi yerine kolektif refahฤฑ รถne รงฤฑkaran olumlu politikalara doฤru bir tercih olabilir. Bakฤฑma รถncelik veren ve yatฤฑrฤฑm yapan sosyal politikalarla ana akฤฑmฤฑ yeniden tasavvur etme รงaฤrฤฑsฤฑ bugรผn her zamankinden daha ulaลฤฑlabilir gibi gรถrรผlmektedir. Yalnฤฑzca bu, รผretim ve yeniden รผretimin adil bir yeniden รถrgรผtlenmesini saฤlamamฤฑza ve bugรผn yerel, ulusal ve uluslararasฤฑ dรผzeyde karลฤฑ karลฤฑya olduฤumuz yapฤฑsal ve sistemsel eลitsizliklerin รผstesinden gelmemize olanak saฤlayacaktฤฑr.
รeviren: Begรผm Zorlu
[1] รevirmen notu: Yazar aฤฤฑrlฤฑkla erkekleri etkileyen krizleri ฤฐngilizce โmancessionsโ olarak tanฤฑmlฤฑyor.
Begum Zorlu 