Turkey’s Venezuela Test: Solidarity Talk and Power Politics

This piece was published at PSA Blog. See the original link here.

The capture of Nicolás Maduro has exposed the limits of Ankara’s performative alliances and the constraints facing middle powers in an increasingly volatile international order.

On January 3, 2026, US special forces carried out a dramatic military operation in Caracas, capturing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and transporting them to the United States, where they now face federal charges. Dubbed “Operation Absolute Resolve,” the raid represented a US intervention in Latin America on a scale not seen for decades. The Trump administration justified the operation by citing longstanding allegations of Maduro’s involvement in drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, yet the action immediately raised serious questions about national sovereignty, international law, and the unilateral use of force.

For Turkey, however, the episode carried significance that extended well beyond these legal and normative debates. It directly tested a foreign policy relationship that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has cultivated since 2016, largely through the language of solidarity and shared political grievance. The detention of a leader repeatedly described by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a “brother” forced Ankara to confront the tension between rhetorical alignment and strategic constraint.

From 2016 to the Present: A Relationship Built on “Anti-Coup” Discourse

The failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016 marked a decisive turning point in Turkey–Venezuela relations, not simply by deepening bilateral ties but by anchoring them in a shared political narrative. At a moment when many Western leaders responded cautiously to developments in Turkey, Maduro was among the first to call President Erdoğan and express unequivocal support. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu later described this gesture as unforgettable, and it became the symbolic cornerstone of a rapidly expanding relationship. For Ankara, Venezuela was elevated from a distant partner to a political ally within a broader discourse opposing coups, external interference, and what Turkish officials increasingly portrayed as Western double standards.

Over time, this alignment evolved into a distinctly performative partnership. Maduro’s continuous public praise of Erdoğan as a leader who stood with the world’s oppressed helped cultivate an image of ideological affinity that went well beyond conventional diplomacy. Through repeated invocations of “democracy against coups,” the relationship was framed as morally principled and value-driven rather than narrowly transactional. This performative solidarity reinforced the sense of a shared political identity and mutual recognition.

Yet symbolism alone did not fully account for the relationship’s durability. It was accompanied by a set of politically salient economic and strategic ties. In 2017, as many international airlines withdrew from Venezuela, Turkish Airlines became one of the few carriers to initiate flights to Caracas. Turkey also emerged as a supplier for Venezuela’s CLAP food subsidy programme. Bilateral trade peaked in 2018, reaching over $1.1bn. Gold trade, in particular, provided a channel through which actors linked to the Maduro government sought to mitigate the effects of international sanctions, with Turkey importing approximately $900 million worth of Venezuelan gold in 2018. Turkish officials and business groups articulated ambitious trade targets, including aspirations to raise annual trade to $5 billion. These exchanges and intentions were not insignificant, but they fell short of the scale and depth of Turkey’s more developed economic partnerships, providing limited institutional substance to a relationship otherwise driven by political symbolism.

A Fast Break

Maduro’s capture abruptly tested this relationship. Turkish officials characterised the US operation as contrary to international law and warned it could deepen Venezuela’s instability. Notably, however, Ankara stopped short of outright condemnation of the United States or any concrete diplomatic response. The language was measured, cautious, and calibrated to avoid escalation.

This restraint exposed a deeper tension at the core of Turkish foreign policy. AKP elites have long presented themselves as principled opponents of externally imposed regime change, framing this stance as a defining element of Turkey’s international identity. At the same time, relations with the United States remain a central strategic constraint, sharply limiting the scope for sustained solidaristic positioning. Maduro’s detention underscored how quickly partnerships built on rhetorical solidarity can be unsettled when confronted with the realities of hard power.

Turkey’s opposition was quick to seize on this tension. Republican People’s Party leader Özgür Özel recalled President Erdoğan’s post-2016 language of brotherhood towards Maduro, presenting Ankara’s current caution as evidence of an unwillingness to antagonise Donald Trump. The criticism sought to expose a gap between the government’s long-standing anti-coup rhetoric and its restrained response in practice. From the government side, however, Burhanettin Duran, Turkey’s Presidential Director of Communications, pushed back by arguing that foreign policy should be guided by sober state interests rather than emotional or bombastic slogans. The exchange laid bare a familiar fault line in Turkish foreign policy: the recurring tension between principled discourse and pragmatic calculation when external power constraints assert themselves.

The Way Ahead

Overall, Maduro’s capture laid bare Turkey’s difficulty in converting symbolic friendship into sustained solidarity. More broadly, the trajectory of the Turkey–Venezuela relationship illustrates the limits of populist rhetoric in foreign policy, as politically performative alignments tend to give way to pragmatism when power balances shift abruptly. Going forward, the Turkish government is likely to recalibrate its engagement with Venezuela towards a lower-profile, more cautious, and selectively transactional relationship, avoiding overt political identification while preserving limited channels of interaction. In this sense, Ankara’s response to events in Venezuela illustrates how middle powers are compelled to navigate between normative posturing and strategic restraint in an international system increasingly shaped by power asymmetries and sudden geopolitical disruption.

The UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review and the Centrality of Threat Framing

This article is a part of the series on the reflection of the 2025 Strategic Defence Review for the Global Disorder Cluster. See the full post here.

August 2025

This year’s UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) marks one of the most significant reconfigurations of British defence policy since the Cold War, shifting focus from two decades of expeditionary warfare[1] towards “warfighting readiness” while emphasising the need to advance in AI and autonomous systems and encouraging whole-of-society preparedness.

Addressing what the review describes as “multiple, direct threats” requiring urgent response, this transformation involves the biggest increase in military spending since the Cold War, extensive nuclear upgrades, and reforms to address modern innovation challenges. The review shows how the current government aims to position security as the fundamental organising principle of governance, supported by Keir Starmer’s opening statement that “national security is the foundation” of the government’s strategy.

Looking across the review, its repeated focus on “whole-of-society” mobilisation (mentioned over 20 times) stands out as a significant shift towards militarisation. Yet what emerges most clearly from the document, and provides the rationale for this shift, is the centrality of threat framing as an organising logic, with every major policy recommendation flowing directly from assessments of adversarial capabilities and intentions.

The review is based on the assertion that Britain faces such profound threats that preserving the current situation is no longer feasible, necessitating comprehensive change. While it recognises challenges like terrorism and demographic shifts, it highlights Russia and China as the main threats influencing the UK’s defence policy.

The document uses temporal indications to distinguish different levels of urgency for various threats. Russia is presented as an immediate threat actively attacking the UK through espionage, cyber-attacks, nuclear threats, and information manipulation. China, meanwhile, is described as a “sophisticated and persistent challenge,” indicating a longer-term pressure that demands ongoing preparedness for strategic competition. These distinctions support both short-term solutions and long-term transformation justified by the urgency framing. Additionally, the emphasis on urgency elevates the overall security situation above usual political cycles.

The focus also presents authoritarian coordination among these states’ leadership as a challenge to what has been called the rules[2]-based international order. It justifies its “NATO First” strategy as crucial for maintaining the global system underpinning Britain’s security. Instead of viewing Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as isolated regional concerns, the document explicitly links them through a pattern of authoritarian cooperation. By emphasising these increasing connections, the review consolidates various security threats into a single, unified threat that requires a comprehensive response.

Nuclear modernisation also exemplifies threat-driven policy, as major investments in new warheads and submarines stem from concerns that Russia and China prioritise nuclear weapons in their security strategies and are quickly growing their arsenals.

Another important part is that the review’s technological transformation plan is directly based on this threat assessment. It highlights worries about artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, particularly in relation to China’s technological progress. The document cautions that Britain might encounter Chinese technology in any conflict or with any opponent. This view shifts innovation focus into a survival mode, making technological progress essential for staying relevant in future conflicts.

Yet this heavy emphasis on technological solutions exposes both contemporary anxieties and potential strategic vulnerabilities. The review repeatedly portrays innovation, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems as decisive in future conflicts, promising that technological progress will restore Britain’s military advantage. Such technological determinism raises concerns about over-reliance on complex systems that may prove fragile in combat, reflecting perhaps unrealistic expectations of what innovation can deliver.

The SDR’s perspective also reveals the constraints imposed by its threat-centric framework. Regions beyond the Euro-Atlantic receive minimal attention beyond scattered references, viewed primarily through narrow lenses of counter-terrorism operations and countering Russian or Chinese influence.

Overall, the SDR demonstrates how threat framing has become the central lens through which British defence policy is articulated, enabling expansive militarisation and technological investment. At the same time, this framing narrows the scope of diplomacy, sidelining issues such as climate change while reinforcing a security agenda defined primarily by great power competition.

[1] Expeditionary warfare refers to the deployment of a state’s military forces abroad to conduct combat operations in a foreign country.

[2] The “rules-based international order” generally refers to the post-1945 system of international norms, institutions, and practices designed to regulate state behaviour through agreed rules rather than raw power.