This article is a part of the series on the reflection of the 2025 Strategic Defence Review for the Global Disorder Cluster. See the full post here.

August 2025

This year’s UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) marks one of the most significant reconfigurations of British defence policy since the Cold War, shifting focus from two decades of expeditionary warfare[1] towards “warfighting readiness” while emphasising the need to advance in AI and autonomous systems and encouraging whole-of-society preparedness.

Addressing what the review describes as “multiple, direct threats” requiring urgent response, this transformation involves the biggest increase in military spending since the Cold War, extensive nuclear upgrades, and reforms to address modern innovation challenges. The review shows how the current government aims to position security as the fundamental organising principle of governance, supported by Keir Starmer’s opening statement that “national security is the foundation” of the government’s strategy.

Looking across the review, its repeated focus on “whole-of-society” mobilisation (mentioned over 20 times) stands out as a significant shift towards militarisation. Yet what emerges most clearly from the document, and provides the rationale for this shift, is the centrality of threat framing as an organising logic, with every major policy recommendation flowing directly from assessments of adversarial capabilities and intentions.

The review is based on the assertion that Britain faces such profound threats that preserving the current situation is no longer feasible, necessitating comprehensive change. While it recognises challenges like terrorism and demographic shifts, it highlights Russia and China as the main threats influencing the UK’s defence policy.

The document uses temporal indications to distinguish different levels of urgency for various threats. Russia is presented as an immediate threat actively attacking the UK through espionage, cyber-attacks, nuclear threats, and information manipulation. China, meanwhile, is described as a “sophisticated and persistent challenge,” indicating a longer-term pressure that demands ongoing preparedness for strategic competition. These distinctions support both short-term solutions and long-term transformation justified by the urgency framing. Additionally, the emphasis on urgency elevates the overall security situation above usual political cycles.

The focus also presents authoritarian coordination among these states’ leadership as a challenge to what has been called the rules[2]-based international order. It justifies its “NATO First” strategy as crucial for maintaining the global system underpinning Britain’s security. Instead of viewing Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as isolated regional concerns, the document explicitly links them through a pattern of authoritarian cooperation. By emphasising these increasing connections, the review consolidates various security threats into a single, unified threat that requires a comprehensive response.

Nuclear modernisation also exemplifies threat-driven policy, as major investments in new warheads and submarines stem from concerns that Russia and China prioritise nuclear weapons in their security strategies and are quickly growing their arsenals.

Another important part is that the review’s technological transformation plan is directly based on this threat assessment. It highlights worries about artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, particularly in relation to China’s technological progress. The document cautions that Britain might encounter Chinese technology in any conflict or with any opponent. This view shifts innovation focus into a survival mode, making technological progress essential for staying relevant in future conflicts.

Yet this heavy emphasis on technological solutions exposes both contemporary anxieties and potential strategic vulnerabilities. The review repeatedly portrays innovation, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems as decisive in future conflicts, promising that technological progress will restore Britain’s military advantage. Such technological determinism raises concerns about over-reliance on complex systems that may prove fragile in combat, reflecting perhaps unrealistic expectations of what innovation can deliver.

The SDR’s perspective also reveals the constraints imposed by its threat-centric framework. Regions beyond the Euro-Atlantic receive minimal attention beyond scattered references, viewed primarily through narrow lenses of counter-terrorism operations and countering Russian or Chinese influence.

Overall, the SDR demonstrates how threat framing has become the central lens through which British defence policy is articulated, enabling expansive militarisation and technological investment. At the same time, this framing narrows the scope of diplomacy, sidelining issues such as climate change while reinforcing a security agenda defined primarily by great power competition.

[1] Expeditionary warfare refers to the deployment of a state’s military forces abroad to conduct combat operations in a foreign country.

[2] The “rules-based international order” generally refers to the post-1945 system of international norms, institutions, and practices designed to regulate state behaviour through agreed rules rather than raw power.